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Organizations and Administrative PracticeA Balance to the Corporate State?
By GENE LIVINGSTON*

IN

The Greening of America,' Charles Reich attributes the formation of administrative agencies to the rise of Consciousness II. According to Reich, Consciousness II occurred when this country realized
that "rugged individualism" (Consciousness 1) was abused by the corporate giants and was used to destroy individual freedoms. Institutionalized democracy was threatened as corporations planned the economy, fixed prices, regulated services such as the distribution of news,
and controlled the lives of workers.2 Thus, administrative agencies
were created to counteract this danger and to serve -the public interest
which was totally ignored by Consciousness I.
The notion that administrators could serve the public interest was
a rational one during the period following the Depression and World
War II. The needs and demands of the masses were obvious. The
imbalance setting management against workers and corporate profits against consumers had to be corrected, the right of workers to associate together and bargain collectively had to be made effective, 3
unemployment compensation, welfare and social security had to be
provided to those discarded by the system, 4 unfair competitive prac* Associate Professor of Law, University of West Virginia. B.A., University
of Oklahoma, 1962; J.D., University of Oklahoma, 1965; Directing Attorney and Regional Counsel, California Rural Legal Assistance, 1968-74.
1. C. REICH, THE GREENiNG OF AMEICA (Bantam ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as REicH].

2. Id. at 38.
3. 'The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and
by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
4. "The Legislature therefore declares that in its considered judgment the public
good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State require the enactment of this
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tices 5 and fraudulent manipulations of corporate securities and assets
had to be stopped. 6 In short, abolishing the abuses causing the economic depression and remedying the harm which had resulted were
readily identifiable as within the public interest.
A comparison of these problems with the solutions provided by
the administrative agencies points up the extent of the success
achieved by those agencies in dealing with the obvious abuses and
problems of that era. However, the performance of administrative
agencies with respect to current problems raises serious questions
about the same agencies' abilities to promote the public interest today.
The public's disaffection with administrators is vividly demonstrated
by the rash of suits challenging administrative actions. The courts in
turn have responded 7 by allowing judicial standing to persons asserting such varied interests as protecting the environment, protecting
sharecroppers from certain demands made by their landlords, and protecting private parties from competition by certain banks in the field
of data processing.8
The agencies' failures to satsify current public needs stem from
two closely related phenomena. First, current problems are more difficult to identify, much more complex, and require exceptionally subtle
administrative actionY Second, the public interest was subverted as
the regulatory agencies became dominated by the corporate structures
measure under the police power of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of funds
to be used for a system of unemployment insurance providing benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment and
the suffering caused thereby to a minimum." CAL. UNEMPLOY'T INS. CODE § 100
(West 1956).
5. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
6. The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-ag, is set out
in S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
7. "In recent years, the courts have become increasingly strict in requiring that
federal agencies live up to their mandates to consider the public interest. They have
become increasingly impatient with agencies which attempt to avoid or dilute their statutorily imposed role as protector of public interest values beyond the narrow concerns
Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy
of industries being regulated."
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the
agencies' failure to represent the general interest, see Butzel, Intervention and Class Actions Before the Agencies and the Courts, 25 AImTN. L. REv. 135 (1973).
8. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
9. For example, a relatively sophisticated knowledge of the economic relationship between sharecroppers and landowners would be required to recognize that amending a regulation to allow the assignment of upland cotton allotments to secure the payment of cash rent for land severely disadvantaged the sharecroppers. See Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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which were to have been the subject of regulation."0 It is, of course,
advantageous to the regulated corporations -that issues are complex and
require subtle analyses, because when few people understand the
effect of proposed actions, little, if any opposition results. Moreover,
administrators, influenced by the interest of the regulated, are easily
blinded to the effect of a given proposal on the general public. The
absence of opposition insures chronic blindness.
Confronted with the current phenomena in the operation of administrative agencies, the question arises as to whether the general
public can secure administrative action more responsive to their needs.
In other words, can those persons whose daily lives are affected in essential aspects by administrative action have an impact on the agency
machinery. The chances for successfully influencing an agency are increased by coalitions making an organized approach to balance the regulated interest. Accordingly, the questions then become concerned
with what tools are available to these groups to produce favorable decisions and regulations from administrative agencies, and what impact the
agency's practices have on the formation and continued existence of
the organization.
The preceding questions will be answered by describing actual
experiences involving the legal requirements and constraints governing
the operation of administrative agencies. These requirements and
constraints include statutes
making agency meetings public;
authorizing agencies to conduct investigations and to enforce laws;
empowering administrators to adopt rules and regulations and to
render decisions in individual cases;
and providing judicial review of administrative actions."
All Meetings Shall Be Open and Public
Frequently a group's first encounter with an administrative
agency involves a procedural rather than a substantive matter. Boards
10. In referring to the formation of administrative agencies, Charles A. Reich
states, "The hope behond this creation was that now public and private power, like the
armies of two great nations, would balance each other, and the result would be containment of both, and safety for the individual. What the theory neglected was the possibility that the two kinds of power might join. And this is what did happen. The final
tragedy of the reform movement is that the power it created was amalgamated with
the private power already in existence, and with the now overwhelming and terrible
power of technology, to form the inhuman structure in which we now live-the American Corporate State." REicir, supra note I, at 60-61.
11. Administrative agencies also fund a variety of group activities-such as medical clinics and economic cooperative ventures; however, such functions are not discussed in this article.
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and agencies have operated for several years without public monitoring or involvement, and consequently are not prepared to provide intervention by a person or group representing a different interest.
A typical example occurred in the Guadalupe Elementary School
District in northern Santa Barbara County, California. The Anglodominated School Board, administration and faculty failed to recognize
and to provide solutions to the special educational problems of its
eighty percent Chicano student population. A group of concerned
parents,' 2 El Comite Consejero de Educacion de Padres de Guadalupe, began monitoring the school board meetings, seeking information and asking for a voice in the operations of -the schools. Despite
these requests, the board met privately and made critical decisions
which were subsequently announced to the public.
The response of the Guadalupe School Board to the parents'
attempt to participate in that agency's operations directly contravened
the California Brown Act. 3 This act clearly recognizes that public
boards and agencies cannot, without public input, serve the public interest:
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do
not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for
the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The
people insist on remaining informed so that
they may retain control over the instruments they have created.' 4
The substantive provision of the act requires that
[a]ll meetings of the legislative body of a local agency shall be
open and public, and all persons shall be permitted to attend any
meeting of the legislative body of a local agency ....
15
The action of the Guadalupe School Board offered El Comite an
opportunity to secure what embryonic groups generally need-a quick
victory. Acting under the authority provided by section 54960 of the
12. The parents' immediate concerns arose when the United States Commission
on Civil Rights conducted a thorough inquiry into the operations of the Guadalupe
schools. The abuses that were documented by the Commission dealt with an educational program not geared to meet the needs of the Mexican-American child, a failure
of the district to hire bilingual and bicultural staff, an excessive use of corporal punishment, failure to involve Mexican-American parents in the school and harassment and

reprisals against individuals who complained about the system.
U.S.

CAL. ADvISORY COMM.,

COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE SCHOOLS OF GUADALUPE-A

TIONAL OPPRESSION (1973).
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE

14. Id. § 54950.
15. Id. § 54953.

§§ 54950-61 (West 1966 & Supp. 1974).

LEGACY OF EDUCA-
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California Government Code, providing for actions by mandamus, injunction or declaratory relief, El Comite sued the board to compel
compliance with the provisions of the Brown Act. That section permits "any interested person" to initiate a legal action "by mandamus,
injunction or declaratory relief.1 6 In El Comite v. McKenzie,"7 the superior court entered an order temporarily restraining the district from
failing and refusing to conduct its meetings openly and publicly. The
result of this quick victory was to increase El Comite's credibility and
to encourage other parents to associate with it. In addition, the agency
now treats the group with a new respect.
A refinement of this situation occurred in Modesto, California,
when the issue of free lunches to low income or needy students caused
overcapacity audiences in meeting after meeting of the local school
board. The board invoked local fire marshal regulations to limit attendance at the meeting and refused to hold -the meeting in a larger
room. "' In response to this action, a lawsuit was brought in support
of the public to compel the board to comply with section 54953 of
the Government Code requiring that "all persons shall be permitted
to attend any meeting of -the legislative body of the local agency. .. ."
Injunctive relief became unnecessary, however, when the district,
as a result of the lawsuit, cut a second door into the wall of the meeting place, thereby increasing the legal capacity of the room by over
20 percent. In addition, a public address system with loudspeakers
placed in the corridors was installed for the benefit of those still unable
to obtain actual admission into the meeting room.
In both Guadalupe and Modesto, a successful resolution of the
first confrontation with the boards provided encouragement 9 for the
groups to add members and to proceed with the substantive issues with
which they were concerned.
Make Investigations and Prosecute Actions
Administrative agencies need not be viewed in all circumstances
by individuals and public interest groups as the adversary. Because
16. In Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors,
263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968), the court held that any county elector
had standing to sue under this section.
17. Civil No. SM 12695 (Super. Ct. Santa Barbara County 1973).
18. The meeting room contained only one exit door. Therefore the legal capacity was significantly less than the physical capacity of the room.
19. The psychological impact of a large group affects both the group's spokesperson and the board by indicating a ground swell of public support.
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all public agencies share in common the problems of either being
understaffed or underprogrammed, 2° they cannot be expected to solve
all problems within their jurisdiction. Priorities vary from agency to
agency and depend on the current political philosophy of the administrator. Frequently these priorities ignore problems critical to an individual or group solely because the agency's staff is unaware of their
existence.
Awareness can be engendered and the agency's investigatory and
enforcement powers invoked2 ' by a written complaint and an aggressive follow-up. 22 This practice is particularly useful where the complaint is against a private business. Most businesses are licensed and
directly regulated by administrative agencies, and all of them are affected by enactments of additional consumer protection laws. In most
instances, a written complaint to the agency requesting an investigation
should garner at least a review of the relevant facts and occasionally the investigation alone will produce a favorable settlement.
Groups can utilize agencies to secure their organizational ends
and enhance their standing by seeking investigations and law enforcement.
For example, in all areas, whether rural or urban, low income
persons endure dilapidated housing conditions. A group such as a
tenants' rights association, organized to assist tenants in improving
their housing, can use local agencies to good purpose. Under section
17961 of the California Health and Safety Code, the housing or health
departments of every city or county are required to enforce those rules
and regulations2 3 adopted by the Commission of Housing and Com20. Consider for example the Bureau of Indian Affairs as the ultimate in an
overstaffed but umderprogrammed agency. The BIA employs one staff person for every
25 Indians, yet a less effective operation is literally inconceivable. OUR BROTHER'S
KEEPER: THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMERICA 6-7 (E. Cahn ed. 1969).
21. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11180 (West 1966) authorizes the head of every state
department to make investigations and prosecute actions concerning all relevant matters.
22. It is usually helpful for an attorney to determine informally the name of a
responsive person to write to and the type of complaint most likely to invoke action.
For example, is the agency motivated more by group than individual complaints, does
it need to tie in specifically to some current project undertaken by the agency? Effective follow-up may include additional contact by telephone or in person and it may
entail writing to legislators and congressmen about the absence of administrative responses.
23. The rules and regulations are contained in CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 25, §§ 100090 and CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 17958 (West Supp. 1973) and require the governing
body of every city or county to adopt ordinances or regulations imposing the same requirements that are contained in the regulations adopted pursuant to this act. If the
local agency fails to do that, the regulations shall be made applicable in any event.
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munity Development pursuant to the State Housing Act.14 Upon reand,
ceipt of a complaint, the local agency will inspect the premises
under section 17980 of the California Health and Safety Code,2 5 give
the landlord a reasonable time to correct the violation. If corrective
action is not taken, the agency shall after thirty days institute appropriate action to abate the violation. Hence, by using the local administrative agency, the organization is able to secure for its members improved housing conditions.
Consumer groups have numerous agencies to which they may
register complaints. The recently established Department of Consumer Affairs is required
[to] receive complaints from consumers concerning (a) unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
undertaken by any person in the conduct of any trade or commerce; (b) the production, distribution, sale, and lease of any
goods and services undertaken by any person which may endanger
the public health, safety, or welfare; (c) violations of provisions
of this code relating to businesses and professions licensed by any
agency of the department, and regulations promulgated pursuant
with the purposes of this
thereto; and (d) other matters 2consistent
6
chapter, whenever appropriate.
The director of the department refers all valid complaints to the state
or federal agency whose authority provides it with the most effective
means of securing relief. 7
A common consumer complaint involves the purchase of defecfive used automobiles. If the defect involves equipment which is
deemed essential to safe driving, the sale of that vehicle is unlawful
under section 24007 of the California Vehicle Code. Such a complaint should be referred to the Director of the Department of Motor
Vehicles2 8 and to the California Highway Patrol. 28 In addition to a
possible criminal prosecution, an inspection by the Highway Patrol
that reveals unsafe equipment also establishes grounds for rescission.
Groups seeking to protect minority rights can file complaints
alleging racial discrimination in the schools with the United States De24. CAL. HEa'H & S. CODE §§ 17910-95 (West 1964).
25. Id. § 17980.
26. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 325 (West Supp. 1973).
27. Id. § 326. Also, sections 9882.0-.13 of the same code created The Bureau
of Automotive Repair to handle complaints relating to car repair.
28. CAL. VFH. CODE § 1650 (West 1971) empowers the Director to "enforce the
provisions of this code relating to the Department."
29. Under CAL. VEn. CODE § 2809 (West 1971), a California Highway Patrolman may inspect any vehicle he reasonably believes to be operated in unsafe condition.
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partment of Health, Education and Welfare," ° of racial discrimination
in employment practices with the California Fair Employment Practice
Commission3 1 and United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission,3 2 and of racial discrimination in housing with the Fair
Employment Practice Commission.3 3
After a group has developed contacts and familiarity with the
operation of an agency, it establishes a reputation for referring valid
complaints. This informal practice can then be used most effectively to
further the aims of the organization and its members with a minimal
expenditure of resources.
Inspection of Public Records
As noted above, many times the clients' complaint lies against
the regulated instead of the regulator. However, the most direct and
often the only conduit for reaching the true adversary is the administrative agency. This is particularly true where the agency has for a
number of years compiled information about the operations of an entity against whom a client has a claim. Sometimes the client's complaint may be based merely on suspicion without the hard evidence
needed to substantiate the claim. For example, under the Hill-Burton
Act,34 hospitals which receive construction money from the federal
government obligate themselves to provide a reasonable volume of
free medical services to indigents.33 Without access to information
compiled by the United States Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, it is impossible to determine the method and extent to which
a hospital complies with this requirement. If the information can be
obtained, and it reveals poor compliance, the client is armed with sufficient facts to seek a judicial order mandating performance.3 6
As in -the situation with the Hill-Burton Act, other cases arise
which depend on obtaining information from the agency. Under both
30. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), prohibits recipients
of federal funds from engaging in any practice which discriminates on the basis of race,
color, or national origin. Because nearly every school in the country receives school
aid, this section is applicable to it and is enforceable by HEW.
31. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1410-22.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1974).
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
1970).

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
CAL. LABOR CODE § 1419.5 (West 1971).
42 U.S.C. § 291-91p (1970 & Supp. 1974).
42 U.S.C. § 291c(a)(1) (Supp.1974); 42 C.F.R. § 53.111 (1973).
See, e.g., Cook v. Oschsner Foundation Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La.
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state37 and federal
enactments, records maintained by administrative agencies are available, with certain exceptions,3 9 for public inspection and copying. Litigation as to the breadth of such enactments,
and specifically of the California Public Records Act, arose in Uribe
40

v. Howie.

The plaintiff in the Uribe case was a farmworker who became
ill, apparently from pesticide poisoning, while working in an agricultural field. The report of the pesticide applicator was needed because
the plaintiff's medical treatment hinged on the types and volume of
pesticides applied. A request for the Teport was made based on the
California Public Records Act, and when ,the request was denied, a
mandamus action to compel inspection of the pesticide reports was
brought. 41 Although -the trial court found against the plaintiff,4 2 the
appellate court held that disclosure of this type of information was required under the Public Records Act and that none of the act's statu43
tory exceptions exempting disclosure were applicable.
The decision in the Uribe case analyzing the Public Records Act
is significant for four reasons. First, the court discussed at length what
constitutes trade secrets, crop reports and reports compiled for licensing purposes, all of which were exempted from coverage under the
Public Records Act.44 Second, in construing these exceptions to the
37. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 6250-60 (West Supp. 1974), specifically section 6253,
requires that "public records [be] open to inspection at all times during the office
hours of the state or local agency and every citizen has a right to inspect any public
record .... "
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
39. The exceptions from the disclosure requirement have caused one commentator
to describe the 1970 federal Freedom of Information Act as "a string of loopholes
[which] [u]nless [filled by] lawyers and courts . . . with rational disclosure policies
. . . will provide less than a straw for the public to grasp while awaiting better information disclosure laws." Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under
the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TExAs L. REv. 1261, 1284 (1970); see Nader,
Freedom From Information, 5 HAnv. Cirv. RIGHTs-Crv. Lm. L. REv. 1 (1970). Ralph
Nader argues that only the regulated have free and full access to administrative information. He documents efforts made by students working with him to obtain certain
types of information from numerous federal agencies. Id.
40. 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 96 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1971).
41. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6259 (West Supp. 1974) authorizes the issuance of an
order to show cause on a verified petition and provides for in camera inspection of
records by the court to determine if the records are being improperly withheld from
a member of the public. Following the inspection, the court either enters an order or
returns the documents to the public official without disclosing their contents.
42. Uribe v. Howie, 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 198-99, 96 Cal. Rptr. 493, 495 (1971).
43. Id. at 214, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
44. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6254(d), (e), (f) (West Supp. 1974). This code section
has been amended so that section 6254(d), which formerly listed "trade secrets" as an
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public inspection requirement of investigatory files, the court alluded
to the Federal Information Act,4 5 which contains similar language, and
utilized federal decisions.48 Third, the court strictly construed the
burden placed on the agency by section 6255 of the Public Records
Act. That section provides:
The agency shall justify withholding any record by demonstrating
that the record in question is exempt under express provisions of
this chapter or that on the facts of the particular case the public
interest served by not making the record public clearly
outweighs
47
the public interest served by disclosure of the record.
In weighing the public interest, the court noted that making this information available would aid enforcement of some of the regulations
regarding pesticide use.48 The fourth significant aspect of Uribe is
that, as far as the medical needs of the individual petitioner were concerned, disclosure of a portion of the records would have sufficed.
Nevertheless, the court made the complete records available because
of the broader public interest in studying the effects of pesticides on
man.

49

Pesticide poisoning also illustrates how the pursuit of administrative information can serve an organizing effort. In this regard, United
Farm Workers Union attempted to diminish the potential harm to
farm workers arising from improper application and use of pesticides.
This naturally served as an inducement for workers to join its ranks.
Part of this effort included the public exposure of all instances of unlawful pesticide application to increase demands for stricter controls.
For that reason, information pertaining to the types of pesticide, the
mixture and the amount applied, contained in reports submitted to
County Agricultural Commissioners pursuant to section 11733 of the
exception to the dictates of section 6253, has been supplanted. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
6254(d) (West Supp. 1974).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
46. The court cited Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 424 F.2d 935
(D.C. Cir. 1970), to reach the decision that the law enforcement or licensing exemption applies only "when the prospect of enforcement proceedings is concrete and definite." 19 Cal. App. 3d at 212, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
47. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6255 (West Supp. 1974) (emphasis added). The discretionary portion of this section which allows the agency to determine what is in the
best public interest is the chief differentiating feature between the California and the
federal act. Under the federal act, the only exemptions are those contained specifically
in the statute. See, Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm.
L. REv. 761, 783-84 (1967).
48. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 211, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
49. Id. at 210, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 503. For a thorough discussion of this case, see
Note, Administrative Law-Freedom of Information, 20 U. KANS. L. REV. 525 (1972).
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California Agricultural Code, and cases like UrIbe v. Howie, became
useful in the organizing efforts of the United Farm Workers Union.
Adoption, Amendment or Repeal of Administrative
Regulations
The first administrative function of an agency with 'which individuals and public interest groups should become involved is the agency's quasi-legislative role of adopting rules and regulations. The rulemaking procedure offers exceptionally significant opportunities for
public interest participation. The significance of such opportunities
can be seen readily amid the growing awareness that agencies which
affect essential aspects of people's day-to-day lives are -apparently beyond the reach of those people. It is this situation which the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders alluded to when it said,
No democratic society can long endure the existence within its
major urban centers of a substantial number of citizens who feel
deeply aggrieved as a group, yet lack confidence in the governinjustice and in their ability to bring
ment to rectify perceived
about needed change." °

Lawyers representing public interest groups certainly should not
underestimate the importance of rule-making. 5 ' Regulations implementing a desired course of action can be written, published and
adopted in sixty days whereas litigation seeking that same course of
action may take years.
Any proposed agency action adopting, amending or repealing a
regulation must satisfy certain procedural requirements; this presents
the opportunity for active group involvement. Under both the state3and federa 5 3 administrative procedure acts, notice by the agency of
its proposed action is mandated. The California law contains several
requirements relating to notice, one being the mailing of such notice
"to every person who has filed a request [therefor] with the state
agency. ) 4 Also, both federal and California laws require that "inter50. REPORT OF TE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CiviL DIsoRbERs 288 (Bantam
ed. 1968).
51. For a discussion of the impact that state and local rulemaking has on the
lives of the poor, see Ashman, Representation for the Poor in State Rulemaking, 24
VAND. L. REv. 1 (1970) and Note, Comments on the California Rulemaking Process
and Processand the Effects Thereon of California Environmental Quality Act of 1970,
5 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 309 (1972).
52. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11371-85 (West 1966 & Supp. 1974).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) contains most of the procedures relating to administrative regulations.
54. CAL. GOVT CODE § 11423(c) (West 1966). In regard to notice under the
federal section, the only requirement is publication in the Federal Register.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

[Vol. 26

ested persons" be given the opportunity to present written statements
and arguments, with California law adding that the agency "shall consider all relevant matter presented to it before adopting, amending or repealing any regulation." 55
Although agencies are not required by California law to allow
oral arguments,5 6 oftentimes they do, greatly enhancing the opportunities for group action. An excellent example of such group involvement in the regulatory process is In re Carmona" filed before the California Industrial Safety Board to have the short-handle hoe, called "El
Cortito" by Chicano farmworkers, declared unsafe as a hand tool
under Labor Code section 6503.58 In Carmona the State Industrial
Board scheduled hearings to be held in San Francisco, El Centro and
Salinas.5 9 Hundreds of farmworkers were interviewed and expressed
unanimous support for outlawing the short-handle hoe. In addition,
farmworkers who had worked with the hoe testified about its impact
on them while neurosurgeons, orthopedic surgeons, and other doctors working in the areas where the short-handle hoe was used testified about the debilitating effects cause by its prolonged use.
Despite the overwhelming evidence justifying the abolition of "El
Cortito," the board yielded to the urgings of a few growers who appeared in opposition to the relief requested by Carmona and others.
A petition for a writ of mandate was filed in the court of appeals and
55. Id. at § 11425; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). In addition to the procedural
requirements of notice and hearing, section 11373 of the California Government Code
restricts an agency to the adoption of regulations "within the scope of authority conferred and in accordance with standards prescribed" by the statute delegating power to
the particular administrative agency. Section 11374 provides that adopted regulations
must be consistent and "reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute."
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11374 (West 1966).
56. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425 (West 1966) ("with or without the opportunity to present [their arguments] orally").
57. Under CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11426 (West 1966), any interested person may
petition an administrative agency for the adoption of a regulation or order, except
where such action is restricted by statute to a designated group. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)
(1970).
58. This section states "[w]henever the division, after a hearing, finds that any
employment . . . is not safe or that the practices, means, methods, operations, or processes employed or used in connection therewith are unsafe, or do not afford adequate
protection to the life and safety of the employees . . . the division shall make an order
relative thereto which is necessary to render the employment or place of employment
safe and to protect the life and safety of employees therein .......
CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 6503 (West 1971).
59. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11427 (West 1966) directs the agency to either deny
the petition or schedule the matter for public hearing within 20 days.
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when the alternative writ was denied a petition for hearing was filed
with the California Supreme Court. On May 24, 1974, that court
agreed to hear the case. The court now has an opportunity not only
to benefit farmworkers who are being incapacitated by the short hoe,
but also to render the rule-making process of all agencies more responsive to the public interest.
Administrative Adjudication
The second major function of administrative agencies is -the rendering of decisions in individual cases. 60 Although this offers a
somewhat less direct opportunity for activities which encourage the
formation and development of organizations, such opportunities for organizing do exist in two major areas.
The first and most common example of group involvement in administrative adjudication is presented when an organization, whose purpose is to assist the person against whom the agency is taking action, appears before the agency on that person's behalf. For example, welfare
rights organizations throughout the United States will appear at hearings to represent a welfare applicant or recipient whose right to receive aid has been adversely affected by an administrative action."
Similarly, such organizations can represent persons adversely affected
by an administrative action under the federal social security aid provisions.6 2 Claimants for unemployment insurance before the Department of Human Resources Development and for unpaid wages before
the Labor Commissioner can also be represented by lay members of
organizations formed for the purpose of assisting employees. 63 Also,
tenants residing in housing projects are now entitled -to a hearing with
60. For a general discussion of the California administrative adjudication process,
see Molinari, California Administrative Process: A Synthesis Updated, 10 SANTA
CLARA LAw. 274 (1970).
61. The right to a fair hearing "in person or through an authorized representative" is set out in CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 10950 (West Supp. 1974). Section
22-001 of the Regulations defines an authorized representative as "an individual, including an attorney at law, firm or organization that has been authorized in writing by
the claimant." Section 10955 allows the applicant to be represented by counsel at the
hearing. See generally Comment, California Welfare Fair Hearings: An Adequate
Remedy?, 5 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 542 (1972).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 406 (1970) declares that persons other than attorneys may represent a claimant for social security benefits. The right to an administrative hearing
to review a decision under the federal social security aid provisions is contained in 42

U.S.C. § 405(b) (1970).
63.

See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1957 (West 1972) (authorizes represen-

tation by counsel or agent).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

representation if they dispute any action by the local housing author6 4

ity.

The second major organizing opportunity afforded by administrative adjudication involves a group's intervention in an on-going administrative process. 5 For example, environmental groups often intervene in 'the process of issuing building permits and in the establishment of long range development plans. The Sierra Club intervened
in the decision of the United States Forestry Service allowing development of the Mineral King mountain area, 66 and the Friends of Mammoth intervened in the decision by the Mono County Board of Supervisors to permit development of the Mammoth Lakes area in Mono
County.67
The same opportunity presented by the Sierra Club and Friends
of Mammoth decisions is available to other groups. In 1972 the Merced County Planning Commission issued a conditional use permit to
a corporation for the construction of a go-kart track near a rural residential area populated solely by low-income blacks. Many of the
eighty-four residents of the area, upset by the prospect of having gokart races disturbing the -tranquility of their rural homes, appealed the
commission's decision to -the Merced County Board of Supervisors.
When the board affirmed the commission's decision, the residents obtained legal assistance. Their attorneys first filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, and then a mandamus action pursuant
to section 1094.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 8 The
basis of this action was the agency's failure to comply with proper procedures and to prepare an environmental impact statement. By the
time the suit was filed, nearly every resident in the area had come
forward to provide a declaration to attach to the petition setting out
the personal harm that would result from the close proximity of a race
track. The value of this concerted, organized effort by the residents
became apparent when the superior court reversed the agency's adjudication and vacated the use permit.
64. HUD Circular RHM 7465.9 (1971). These rules contain a provision for
tenants to sit on the appeal panel-another purpose for a tenant's organization.
65.

See generally Symposium:

Public Intervention, 25

ADMIN.

L. REv. 135

(1973).
66. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
67. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049,
104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
68. Fulmer v. Merced County Bd. of Supervisors, Civil No. 44443 (Super. Ct.
Merced County (1972)).
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Judicial Review
Filing a lawsuit against an agency remains the ultimate counterbalance that individuals and groups have to promote the public's interest. Judicial redress may be sought to obtain review by a court of
the validity of an agency rule or regulation or the correctness of an
adjudication.
A specific prodecure is provided in California for the judicial review of an agency's adoption, amendment or repeal of a regulation.
Section 11440 of the California Government Code authorizes "[a]ny
interested person' to bring an action for declaratory relief to determine whether the action is invalid on "any other ground which may
exist" or -for "a substantial failure [on the part of the agency] to comply with the provisions of [the code]." 69 Adjudicatory decisions may
be reviewed under section 11523 of the California Government Code
in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to writ of mandate. 0
Litigation may also be used when a client has a complaint against
the agency which cannot be resolved through the administrative process. These situations frequently arise where a local or state agency
receives a grant to provide certain community services. The most
common example of this situation involves the obligation of local urban
renewal agencies to use available federal -funds to provide adequate
comparable housing for those persons displaced as a result of redevelopment.' 1 If such housing is not provided, the displaced persons'
only option is to seek an order requiring compliance with the statutory
and grant requirements. 72
Another example where litigation may be necessary and which
would affect a broad segment of the population is the National School
Lunch Act 73 which imposes requirements on local school districts
participating in the lunch program. In Shaw v. Governing Board of
Modesto City Schools,74 a -number of low income residents of Modesto,
California, organized a group to urge the school board to comply with
69. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11440 (West 1966).
70. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 1094.5 (West 1955) sets out the procedure for reviewing administrative decisions.
71. Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1455c, 1465 (1970).
72. See, e.g., Arrington v. City of Fairfield, 414 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1969); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 384 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-63 (1970). Specifically, section 1758 sets out the obligations of participating school districts.
74. 310 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
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the directive of the National School Lunch Act that "meals shall be
served without cost or at a reduced cost to children who are determined by local school authorities to be unable to pay the full cost of
the lunch."7 5 By filing the injunctive action in federal court and
through the publicity given to subsequent hearings, this small group
achieved the notoriety it needed to build an organization composed
of a cross section of Modesto residents concerned about the nutritional
needs of low income people. The community contacts resulting from
this organizational action were used later to help acquire and distri76
bute food to meet the needs of the county's residents.
When litigation is initiated against an agency procedural questions
of ripeness, exhaustion of administrative remedies and standing are
often raised. The United States Supreme Court in discussing the rationale behind the ripeness defense explained that the doctrine shall be
employed
to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. 7 7
In other words, ripeness depends on "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.

78

The exhaustion of administrative remedies 79 defense is often
raised inappropriately whenever an action is filed against an administrative agency:
The mere possession by some official body of a continuing supervisory or investigatory power does not itself suffice to afford an
"administrative remedy" unless the statute or regulation under
which that power is exercised establishes clearly defined machin75.

Id. at 1285, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1758 (1970).

The resulting organization

mobilized in December of 1969 to obtain an emergency declaration from the Board
of Supervisors because of massive unemployment. Food commodities and emergency
food funds were sent to the county in response to the needs articulated by this group.
76. Some of these activities, begun as a result of this initial impetus, are continuing today.

For example, food banks supported and operated by the Modesto Council

of Churches continue to provide food to families in situations where they are not served
by established agencies.

77. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).

See generally

Note, Timing of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 56

CALIF.

L. REV. 1491 (1968).
78. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
79. For a discussion of the question of exhaustion in California, see Note, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (1968).
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ery for the submission, evaluation and resolution of complaints by
aggrieved parties.8 0

Furthermore, the inadequacy or nonavailability of an "administrative
remedy" renders inapplicable the requirement that a party exhaust its
administrative remedies before proceeding to the litigation stage. 81
The third defense which is often raised in actions against administrative agencies is lack of standing. The standing question in a federal context was given a definitive answer by the United States Supreme Court in SierraClub v. Morton.8" There the Court stated:
Where the party does not rely on any specific statute authorizing
invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a "personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy".

. .

as to insure that "the dis-

pute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution." 8 3
The Court relied on Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations,Inc. v. Camp84 and Barlow v. Collins"5 to conclude that
standing exists under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act where
the challenged action
had caused [the plaintiffs] "injury in fact," and where the alleged
injury was to an interest "arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated"
8 6 by the statutes that the agencies were
claimed to -haveviolated.
In California the issue of standing is not a serious barrier to a
public interest group seeking judicial redress. For example, the stat87
ute authorizing judicial review of adopted rules and regulations
allows any interested person8s to bring the action. The general rule
is that
80. Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 566, 421 P.2d 697, 701, 55 Cal. Rptr.
505, 509 (1967).
81. Ramos v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 691, 484 P.2d 93, 97, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 421, 425 (1971). In Ramos, minor welfare recipients were terminated from aid
because of their failure to work in the 1967 grape harvest. An action seeking money
damages for the named plaintiffs and an injunction for the class of welfare recipients
was filed. The supreme court held that the fair hearing procedure was an inadequate
administrative remedy because it did not allow for relief to a class, prospective relief,
or money damages.
82. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
83. Id. at 732, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), and Elast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
84. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
85. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
86. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
87. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11440 (West 1966). See text accompanying notes 6970 supra.
88. Interested persons are defined as those "within the ambit of the statute imple-
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where the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in
the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen
in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.8 9
Although litigation is the ultimate exercise of power by a public
interest group, it offers little to help sustain an organization. When
the lawsuit is filed the group is highly visible and portrayed as a representative of the public interest. At this point, the group's potential
for expansion is at its maximum. Unfortunately, the litigative process
often lasts several years and provides neither incentive nor impetus
for organizing. Experience has revealed that a group unable to define other related issues and projects justifying its continued existence
will not remain viable despite the pending litigation.9 0
Conclusion
As we wait for Charles Reich's Consciousness 1I191 to sweep the
country, we are left with the administrative agency as the most direct
mechanism for effectuating those policies which promote the public
interest. For that mechanism to be used successfully, it is obvious
that a counterbalance to the common interest of the corporate state
is essential. The only source of that counterbalance lies with the people. Individually the people appear ineffectual, but if organized they
can potentially re-tool the administrative agencies to produce actions
more responsive to their needs. Re-tooling is possible, however, only
when the maximum use is made of the procedural devices of the administrative process. This can be achieved in the following ways:
1. Agencies must be held accountable, not only for their ultimate decisions, but for the processes by which they reached those deoisions.
mented by the rule." Charles L. Harney, Inc. v. Contractors' State Lic. Bd., 39 Cal.
2d 561, 565, 247 P.2d 913, 915 (1952); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. California State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 241 Cal. App. 2d 229, 231-33, 50 Cal. Rptr. 489, 491-92 (1966).
89. Board of Social Welfare v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 98, 100-01,
162 P.2d 627, 628-29 (1945).
90. A group organized in Stockton, California, to desegregate the public schools,
realized after a few months that a judicial solution was both slow and uncertain. Hernandez v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 101016 (Super. Ct. San Joaquin County), filed
on April 6, 1970, was not tried until four years later. Consequently, they chose
to pursue a second course at the same time. The goal of the group then became
to elect school board members who would be more responsive to the interests of
minority students. They organized politically and at the last school board election,
five of seven candidates they sponsored were elected.
91.

REICH, supra note 1, at 233.
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2. Investigations and prosecutions of violations of laws affecting the general public -must be forced to the forefront of the agency's
practice.,
3. Information compiled by agencies and secreted for the protection of their corporate partners must be made available to the public.
4. Input must be received by agencies frompublic interest
groups if agency rules and regulations are to meet instead of avoid
the needs of the groups' members.
5. The adjudicatory process must be rendered more responsive
by providing additional representation at individual hearings and by
intervening to voice the cause of the public.
6. Now that the concept of standing has been further defined,
judicial review of agency determinations must be sought to guarantee
greater compliance with procedural and substantive legal standards.
By using the foregoing devices, groups can exert a significant impact on the administrative process and can better realize their public
interest goals. In addition, use of the administrative process can provide the impetus for the formation or expansion of the group because
the ingredients that are essential to a group's existence, e.g., a critical
project, group publicity, and service to its members, can be found in
the administrative practice.

